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Prometheus, Hermes, 
And Other Voices 
Giampiero Comolli, Alessandro Dal Lago, 
Maurizio Ferraris, Francesco Leonetti, 
Pier Aldo Rovatti 
Excerpted from a roundtable discussion held in Milan in 1987 upon publication of 
Prometeo e Hermes. Colpa e origine nell'immaginario tardo-moderno by Carlo Formenti. 
Napoli: Liguori editore, 1987 
Abstract 
The essay has two parts: the first deals mainly with epistemological themes, the second 
with theoretical-political subjects. 
In the first chapter the author sketches the general outlines of the book, which can 
be linked to a project of radicalization of the metaphor of weak thought. This involves 
"taking the metaphor literally," in the sense that the modern subject should not limit itself 
to recounting its own decline, but should agree to step aside, to leave the floor to images. 
Nevertheless, this is not an invitation to abandon the way of the logos, of modern discursive 
and instrumental reason, to embark on the road of the ineffable, of mysticism, and of 
contemplation, but rather to grasp the ambiguity of the process of secularization, to discover 
how this is preparing the return of ancient mythical figures: Prometheus and Hermes. 
The themes of the second chapter, which delineates the characteristics of the new 
Prometheus, are the Marxian category of second nature, revisited from an historical point 
of view as an artificial environment that shirks human understanding and the human 
[Translated from the Italian by Michael Rocke] 
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project; and the paradox of a productive subject that, while it disposes of modern technolog-
ical powers, is forced to pay, to a greater extent than in any other epoch, the symbolic 
debt of original sin, that human gesture took possession of Nature . 
The Promethean utopia of reconciliation with a Nature that has been completely 
absorbed by human sociability appears disarmed before the late-modern evolution of 
science and technology. We are in the era of Hermes, which the author describes in the 
third chapter, beginning with several key concepts elaborated by scientists and 
philosophers such as Prigogine, Thom, Serres, and Bateson. Hermes is the golden boy 
who teaches us to seize occasions in a world in which disorder and fortuitousness are 
increasing . He represents the knowledge of the premises, of circumstance, of the uncertain, 
he is the power of the "micro." 
The second part, divided into two chapters, follows the road that leads from Pro-
metheus to Hermes, viewed as a transformation of the modes of political rationality: from 
the "tragic" rigor of the opposition friend/enemy to the ambiguity of the systemic concep-
tion of politics, which seems able to overcome the antagonistic form of conflicts. In the 
first chapter the author develops a critique of Rene Girard's anthropological theories: the 
persistence of the sacred, associated with the decline of its structural apparatus (seculari-
zation), is the element that constitutes a reflection on modern political violence. The last 
chapter-which makes reference to the labor theories of the 1970s, the systemic cybernetic 
functionalism of Luhmann, and the culture of the "greens" -traces a path for an adequate 
distancing from the "sacrificial" results of the revolutionary project. 
Pier Aldo Rovatti: Formenti's book has the ability to record, to 
sensitize, a number of theoretical events that have occurred in the 
last ten or fifteen years. This certainly describes the book, but in 
itself it is insufficient. If the book is a sort of sensory organ for what 
has happened in theory, or in a part of theory, it also intends to 
advance a point of view, a project of reflection: a modification, 
we might call it, of the usual way of thinking. In the main, I agree 
with this proposal. 
A critique can begin to grow out of the means and the conse-
quences we can derive from this modification. I found a sort of 
double movement in the book towards which we might orient the 
discussion. On one hand, and I think this is the sense of the 
reference, however cautious, to "weak thought," there is a loosen-
ing and a distancing-a movement away from violence, from 
forms of theory that involve violent elements, in short, a "relaxa-
tion of antagonism." There is also a taking of distance from these 
forms: the dual concept of the title, Prometheus and Hermes, can 
also be read in this light. Loosening/distancing from the violent 
elements represented by unity, by the omnia in unum (in Serres' 
sense in Rome). 
Along with this movement, however, we also find the neces-
sity of "remythicization": the positive suggestion of a reemergence 
of the sacred, in a critical relation compared to the usual debates 
on secularization. 
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To me, in short, the marriage of these two movements seems 
difficult: the loosening, with its suitable images, and the 
reemergence of the sacred, which evidently implies that something 
unknown will appear on the scene, something which is extraneous 
to us, invisible, and which thus perhaps cannot be assumed di-
rectly within an image or within the imaginary. 
When in the book, for example, it is assumed that theory can 
fluctuate in accord with the fluctuations of the physical world, we 
find a sort of identification between modes of thinking about reality 
and modes of being in reality. But if that's the case, I don't see 
how the element of the "sacred" can intervene in this hypothesis 
of identification. Either it must be rethought in another way, or 
it constitutes a real contradiction. 
Giampiero Comolli: One of the merits of Formenti' s book is to show 
how we are faced today with the persistence of a mythical universe. 
The secularization of the post-modem, or better, late-modem 
world, is not pure and linear. Rather it gives rise to the labyrinthine 
emergence of myths, images, figures, the presence of sacrality. 
Secularization, therefore, as a form of remythicization: in the social 
field, in the field of knowledge, and in the sciences, we are witness-
ing the birth of new mythical figures. Prometheus and Hermes 
are among us once more. 
It seems to me that Formenti' s book helps us understand how 
this manifestation of myths, of images, also involves an alteration 
of the status of their reality [statuto di realta]. These images cannot 
be taken as pure and simple images. From the first page of the 
book, when he speaks about the metaphor of "weak thought," 
Formenti tells us it is necessary to take the metaphor not allegor-
ically, but "literally." Now it seems to me this proposal regards not 
only weak thought. It is late-modem myth in its entirety that has 
acquired a different form of reality, becoming, let's say, more real. 
Figures, metaphors, images are not-or are no longer only-signs 
of language, signifiers that stand for an absent reality; they no 
longer belong to the universe of communication, but instead enter 
the universe of the symbol. And the symbol is understood here in 
the sense of putting together, recomposing fragments of separate 
realities. It therefore no longer appears as a significant term, but 
rather as a form of being, of reality. 
Accepting this meaning of the symbol, one can go so far today 
as to say that an analogy exists between consciousness and being: 
the structures of thought are revealed to be homologous to those 
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of reality. Hermes is not an invention of our imagination, but 
"exists," in the sense that reality today assumes, or can assume, 
among others, also the form of Hermes. And therefore, in order 
to know and to act in reality, we must know how to think like 
Hermes, to be Hermes. Like Hermes, Formenti's book also wants 
to be messenger and "psyco-pomp": the guide of souls towards 
the host of late-modem images. 
I think, however, that in order to be able to find one's way 
among such a multitude without getting lost in the labyrinth of 
images, one also needs to know how to distinguish them, to 
recognize their differences, and it is with regard to this differen-
tiation that the road traced by Formenti still seems imprecise, 
uncertain. Let me give an example. Formenti speaks about the 
need to reduce the antagonism based on the opposition friend/ 
enemy. This opposition derives from the persistence of the neces-
sity of sacrifice, on which sacrality is based. The persistence of 
sacrifice informs us that secularization has not allowed us to escape 
sacrality. Remythicization, seen by Formenti as a positive 
phenomenon, goes along with resacralization (the necessity of 
"enemies" and of their sacrifice), from which Formenti wants to 
distance himself. Here then there's a problem, which regards pre-
cisely the reality status of images. The opposition friend/enemy 
collapses to the extent that one myth is born of another. The 
"other" is sacrificed since he no longer appears to be a man, but 
rather a human subspecies, a near-animal, a "not-man, but only 
enemy." But the moment I consider the other, literally, as a harmful 
animal, I am justified in killing, in making a sacrifice. In sacrifice, 
therefore, we also have an employment of literal metaphors. And 
the persistence of the sacred, the diffusion of new forms of sac-
rifice, derives from the fact that images are sacrificed by taking 
them literally. These sacrificed images are represented as realities 
that cast a spell over the subject, that overcome it and destroy it. 
In the opposition friend/enemy, the subject is overwhelmed by 
an image that appears to be real. It might be necessary here to 
introduce the notion of "fantasma," a form of presentation of a 
"para-real" image that coincides neither with the image of the 
metaphor nor with that of the symbol. 
For, to conclude quickly, I also believe that between metaphor 
and symbol there cannot be one and the same reality status [statuto 
di realta]. If the symbol is real and it places us in a homology 
between being and knowing, the fact remains that being does not 
coincide with knowing (except in "extreme" philosophies, like 
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Zen, which would put us on another, still more distant road) . 
Therefore, one can't simply or with impunity leave the universe 
of the sign to "symbolize oneself" in the real. Even in a symbolic 
means of recomposition within the real, the metaphor always 
remains sign, distinct in its tum from "fantasma." 
To enter into the late-modem mythic universe it seems neces-
sary, therefore, to distinguish between the different forms of 
images and myths that we meet. But how do we distinguish them? 
Distinguishing, in fact, is essentially a conceptual, abstract, and 
anti-mythical operation, a form of thought that forces us to leave 
just that world of images into which we want to or must enter. 
The way of distinguishing, and the form of conceptualization, 
therefore, must also change. But how? By employing images 
within concepts, Formenti tells us. So one can no longer distin-
guish between concepts and images. In this way the philosophy 
of difference (on which the Western logos is based) would end up 
caught in an unending spiral between image and concept (where 
the "between" would no longer be a difference but the constant 
annulment of difference). Formenti's book makes us reflect on the 
enigma of this mythic spiral. 
Francesco Leonetti: I feel you two have very keenly investigated 
several points : the sacred, metaphor, myths. I would like to insist 
on these, but above all through a more general examination of 
the problem the book presents, in my opinion. 
I believe the book utilizes, or wants to use, or wants to make 
use of, anthropological time, in the current absence of an historical 
project. It does this, of course, by showing the protracted incidence 
of the imaginary; but I would say that it feels the effects of this 
absence, this void so strongly that it calls into play several rather 
unexpected elements in theoretical discourse. 
On the other hand, it seems that the book displays that point 
of view we are all familiar with-a traditional one in leftist criticism, 
and especially in critical Marxism, where in criticizing competing 
theorists one also uses them, or alternatively one tries to connect 
as much as possible and relate to one's own position that which 
theorists on the other side of the fence have advanced. These 
constant comparisons operate throughout the book and display 
a very precise and important review survey. This is true, for exam-
ple, also with regard to Girard, from whom comes the most plaus-
ible influence, on the sacred. But it seems to me that even Girard's 
influence is not exhaustive. Formenti has produced a book that's 
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very sophisticated, challenging, intricate, and one wonders just 
how conscious he is of this, or whether he's a little bit sorcerer's 
apprentice, nothing bad intended, we all are a little .... 
One notices that, as in Girard' s case--not to speak of the cri-
tiques of excellent theoretical texts like Luhmann' s and Bateson' s 
and Serres', or perhaps of more remote works like Kerenyi' s, or 
questionable works, like Capra' &-there's always a desire to 
criticize and at the same time to thoroughly examine current posi-
tions; since today the discourse of the theoretical left of the past 
no longer has any certainties, any foundations. One continues to 
do it purely as hypothesis, as the prolongation of a choice which 
today is impossible for all of us: linking theoretical arguments of 
different extraction to one of our basic materialistic positions which 
has kept its same constants, while really this position itself is at 
stake and demands a return to theoretical materialism on the 
essential points . Formenti draws out and augments the stakes. 
Well, what happens then? As I see it, in the most interesting 
part of the book, Formenti postulates a certain relationship be-
tween two moments of order and disorder. Order isn't something at 
whose margins disorder exists--patrolled by a new science or a 
new philosophy of science--and there isn't even a basic disorder, 
as there in fact is in the new sciences, on top of which human 
mental representation establishes laws and reasons . For Formenti, 
however, there are two components that, though not in a dialectic 
relationship, are nevertheless fundamental. He presents these as 
"diurnal and nocturnal," and he pursues them in various ways, 
always with a certain instability since in effect the book isn't 
monolithic or developed in an explicit fashion. In my opinion, 
then, there's a sort of dualism, and this creates the need to offer 
alternatives, by showing that everything is determined but that, 
in effect, within this fixity there is no stability. This is a common 
philosophical-scientific assumption, but in Formenti' s discourse 
it still manages to have a philosophical-political force. This is a 
possible reading that emerges every so often from the book, but 
at other times it gets tangled up in the direct debate with the texts 
it examines. 
Maurizio Ferraris: I would like to emphasize three points related 
to the first part of the book, the epistemological-philosophical 
part, that appear to be of great importance for what we could 
define as the link between Hermes and hermeneutics. 
The first is very general, and is partly connected to what 
Leonetti has already said. Prometheus and Hermes examines the 
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transition from Prometheus to Hermes, which is like saying from 
tragedy to interpretation. Now Leonetti is right when he says that 
the way this transition is treated in the book is mainly anthropolog-
ical, and at bottom doesn't sufficiently take into account the 
philosophy of history and of theology implicit in this transition. 
In short, the question is dodged: Why, with what motives, and 
pursuing what ends, did there occur this historical passage from 
a Promethean epoch to a hermeneutic one (with all the possible 
modulations in the Prometheus/Hermes alternation, starting with 
modern/post-modern)? 
The second point is closely related to the first. The fact that 
the transition from Prometheus to Hermes is not sufficiently con-
sidered as an historical progression implies a limited mediation 
between the two, as if Hermes were the simple antithesis of Pro-
metheus, and not rather his Aufhebung, so to speak, that which at 
the same time surpasses and preserves in itself what came before, 
Prometheus. In this way the transition to interpretation doesn't 
purely and simply exclude tragedy; rather, it assumes it and at 
the same time reelaborates it like its own opposite foundation. In 
short, it appears that the Prometheus/Hermes polarity, which is 
treated with great clarity and persuasiveness, is expressed in ex-
cessively dualistic terms. 
Alongside this dualism, and this is the third and last point, it 
seems to me a certain positivistic aura still needs to be emphasized. 
In Formenti' s discourse, epistemological transformations consti-
tute both the point of departure and the last instance that governs 
an analysis that involves the anthropological study of collective 
imagination . Now why must science have this role as the instance 
of last appeal? Where does it get such authority, in comparison, 
say, with philosophy, with art, or with history? These considera-
tions obviously do not point to a single shortcoming in Formenti' s 
analyses, but rather to a comprehensive system within which 
these analyses are inscribed (I'm thinking especially of Serres and 
Thom), and in which one recognizes this quality, in my view 
positivistic, of the epistemological moment . 
Alessandro Dal Lago: I will limit myself to a few considerations on 
the relationship sacred/secularization, which in my opinion is one 
of the central aspects of the book. First, I agree with the outline 
traced by Formenti: from the tragic foundation, which Formenti 
reconstructs through Girard, to the fact that the sacred, as it be-
comes inflated , circulates, becomes currency and then dissolves. 
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This is the problem that returns in the book's conclusion. This is 
the theme of secularization, which needs to be seen together with 
the production of images as characteristic of the new knowledge 
(a knowledge that is not imaginary but the creator of images, 
which seems to replace classical rationality) and therefore charac-
teristic of a presumed re-mythicization. 
Now without getting into Maurizio Ferraris's comments on 
history of philosophy, I think the theme of secularization poses 
important interpretive problems. We're used to thinking of sec-
ularization as a sort of drying up of the sources of the sacred, 
while instead it appears to be a dispersion, a disintegration of the 
religious factor in modern life. I think that the notion of seculari-
zation, not only in philosophic terms but also in the experience 
of daily life, is more complex, and that it excludes a radical dualism 
such as sacrality/rationalization. Secularization takes on an ambig-
uous form. In the first place, it is the decline of religious authority, 
the end of the Church's grip on the formation of the imaginary 
and of experience. In the second place, this loosening involves a 
rebirth of religious experience. If we look at recent empirical 
studies on this theme, for example Garelli's, we find that seculari-
zation (the Church's loss of influence) produces phenomena such 
as the growth of fundamentalist groups, or the return to fashion 
of archaic, Eastern, or magical religious practices. The two things 
go together. It's difficult to say whether the rebirth of fundamen-
talism is a revival of the religious or an echo of the disintegration 
of religious culture. 
This problem, which we could call the post-modernity of be-
liefs, runs parallel to another distinction posed by Formenti' s book, 
that is, the breakdown of the friend/enemy relationship. To the 
extent to which the friend/enemy opposition is generalized, as 
Formenti shows, in the whole social world, in all areas of experi-
ence, it gets inflated and collapses. Antagonisms are substituted 
by fragmentation, nonconflictual pluralism. 
I would like therefore to pose a question to the book's author, 
to conclude this first comment. If this is the evolution that Formenti 
reconstructs (and correctly, I might add), then why do the 
categories he uses come above all from scientific discourse? How 
does he legitimize the privilege ascribed to scientific discourse, 
even if it is the critical version of the new rationality, a version 
that renounces positivism, as Ferraris has already said? Why 
privilege scientific over other forms of discourse, literary discourse 
for example, or certain aspects of contemporary philosophy, which 
address this situation of ambiguity in an equally radical way? After 
ROUNDTABLE 247 
all, at the end of the book even the author finds a way out through 
a type of thinking that is nonscientific: Eastern Philosophy. 
Francesco Leonetti: It seems to me that many themes have been 
sufficiently and well discussed in this first round. Formenti has 
of course only begun to develop the arguments of his discourse, 
which he will continue to explain in future works. 
I would simply like to make an observation directed both to 
Ferraris, who spoke about positivism, and also to Dal Lago, who 
asked explicitly why the theoretic-scientific discourse prevails over 
the philosophic one. 
Ferraris should really specify what he means. We all know 
that positivism means reference to the fact, but after positivism, in 
the theoretical-scientific field, there's neo-positivism, which deals 
with linguistics rather than with facts, with a very marked displace-
ment; and then there's post-positivism, which is characterized by 
the assertion that there is no sure experimental verification. In 
this sense, then, I find it interesting-which is not to say successful 
or settled, but interesting-that the movement of the relationship 
between the two fields (scientific and philosophical) that exists in 
Formenti's book, always refers to the neo-positivists or even to 
the post-positivists. 
Alessandro Dal Lago: And in reference to the question I posed? 
Francesco Leonetti: It remains open. With the clarification, however, 
that you pose a contradiction, whereas it seems to me that, pre-
cisely because we're no longer talking about positivism but, if 
anything, about post-positivism, the movement between the two 
camps is useful, and interesting, Formenti' s book being a case in 
point. 
Pier Aldo Rovatti: I have the impression that Carlo Formenti is 
moving in the direction of a physical-politics. The assertion of a 
physical-politics involves, however, an adherence to a philosophy, 
and this philosophy must be capable of mirroring this physical-
politics. In my view, this direction clashes with the existence of 
a philosophy which instead recognizes the crisis of the idea of 
truth, and poses problems of distancing, of removal, of metaphor, 
of image, etc. 
Alessandro Dal Lago: I wanted to emphasize that, as is pointed out 
in Formenti' s book, one of the most interesting aspects of the new 
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philosophy of science is that scientific discourse is no longer pro-
tected by an epistemological-rhetorical wall, as it was in classical 
positivism and in neo-positivism. It is well known that positivism 
is not so much a form of knowledge based on empirical under-
standing ( one thinks of the human and social sciences at the end 
of the nineteenth century), but is rather a rhetoric of empirical 
knowledge . Formenti rightly emphasizes the anthropological 
background of scientific discourse, taking the origins of knowledge 
back to what I call the "tragic model," and therefore to a founding 
sacrificial act. This analysis seems completely acceptable. But a 
problem arises. When the positivistic wall crumbles, reflection on 
science is "de-positivized" (as in the authors cited by Formenti, 
Prigogine and others, who refer to Valery, Bergson, etc.). 
Shouldn't the hermeneutical field of discourse on rationality then 
be broadened to include literature, poetry, narrative, as has al-
ready occurred in other sectors of contemporary philosophy (I'm 
thinking of Ricoeur)? 
Maurizio Ferraris: I also want to clarify briefly something referred 
to by Leonetti, who rightly pointed out the obscure and imprecise 
points in my comment. I agree, there isn't a single positivism, 
but many different modulations of the same idea; Serres' 
positivism is different, of course, from that of Carnap or of Comte. 
More precisely, Serres' positivism does not consist of imposing 
everywhere and indiscriminately a cult of facts and of verifiability, 
but rather of attempting an alliance between natural science and 
science of the spirit, oriented mainly towards the former . 
Pier Aldo Rovatti: In any case the fact remains that there is an 
important difference between the idea of science that Heidegger 
had and the idea of science that we might have. The problem is, 
what sorts of questions do we bring to bear on the new forms of 
knowledge? If anything it's philosophy that appears to be behind 
on this question and to use old models of thinking, expecting 
truths from science, when instead we should probably ask science 
for images and sketches of the imaginary that might not confirm 
the identification between the technique and the metaphysics of 
the subject. 
Alessandro Dal Lago: It's true that philosophy, from a certain view-
point, is incapable of confronting the new scientific subjects. After 
all, the critique of positivistic metaphysics already existed in the 
time of Whitehead and Bergson, who insist on the dynamic charac-
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ter of scientific knowledge. But when Heidegger, for example, 
reflects on science, basing himself curiously enough on Heisenberg 
and consequently on his age's most advanced reflections on con-
temporary science, he presents an image of scientific knowledge 
that is somehow totalitarian, authoritarian, which the new reflec-
tions call into question. Here a problem arises: either Heidegger's 
criticism reveals, despite everything, a metaphysical bias (a unitary 
and nonproblematical image of science), or the new knowledge, 
which is at the center of Formenti' s book, achieves a new form 
of authority that today is more difficult to characterize. 
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